January 19, 2012
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COUNTDOWN TO LINEBACKER II: A B-52 Story
SAC’s Eleven-Day War The following article contains excerpts from Aviation Week and Space Technology Magazine. Following the article is my view of events leading up to "the first full scale ECM war between massive offense and massive defense." The Pacific Daily News, Agana, Guam, 14 February 1973 Magazine Claims: U.S. Bombing Sobered Hanoi Washington (UPI) — Aviation Week and Space Technology Magazine published an editorial purporting to demonstrate that North Vietnam had been forced back to the conference table in Paris by the overwhelming military success of the 12-day December bombing. "The American people, who have had so much of their blood and treasure squandered in futile, ineffective military efforts in Vietnam, deserve to know that the war was finally ended by two decisive, effective applications of military power," the magazine said. Saying there was ample evidence to prove what had happened in the bombing, it added: "But this evidence is being withheld from the American people by their own government because of sincere, although we think mistaken, political reasons." It continued: "Certainly the people of North Vietnam know what happened. The Hanoi government is aware of the crippling military industrial damage it suffered and the sharpness of the prod that sent the swift massive destruction of their war-making potential and economy that sent the Hanoi negotiators back to the peace table for serious business." The magazine said Hanoi first appeared willing last summer to negotiate seriously in Paris because its military capacity had then reached its lowest point. "Its massive spring military offensive was a shambles," the magazine said. "Its vital arteries for war supplies had been severed by the mining of Haiphong and other ports and the new technology of the aerial interdiction campaign." At this point, it said, Hanoi’s Communist partners, China and the Soviet Union, joined in a massive re-supply effort. "Soviet ships clogged Chinese ports and rail lines through southeastern China were jammed with cars of Russian and Chinese equipment moving toward Hanoi. The rail lines in North Vietnam were knocked out by air attacks, but the supplies oozed south by truck and sampan until by October, Hanoi felt strong again." At that point, Aviation Week continued, "the serious peace negotiations turned frivolous." The magazine speculated that Hanoi at that point anticipated U.S. resumption of bombing and was "probably prepared to absorb the relatively light damage that the laser-targeted fighter bombings could inflict in the thick monsoon weather." But, it said, Hanoi was apparently totally unprepared for President Nixon’s decision "to unleash the massive weather-penetrating weight of the 200-airplane B-52 iron bomb fleet." It continued: "For 11 days with only one 24-hour pause at Christmas, the B-52s pounded military targets in the north from dusk to dawn. About 1,000 sorties were flown; each dumping 24 tons of iron bombs with radar-guided precision that was astonishing by any standards other than laser-guidance. ... Hanoi marshaled its air defenses quickly. With the SAM stockpiles replenished and a two-month respite from defense suppression attacks, it responded fiercely and B-52s began to be hit." Aviation Week said the resulting battle was the first full-scale ECM (electronic-countermeasures) war between massive offense and massive defense. Both sides, it said, improvised their tactics and equipment as the battle raged. Hanoi tracked strobes from B-52 ECM emissions, triangulated sources, computed flight paths and then fired salvos as great as 100 SAMS along the bombers predicted path. B-52 losses reached a peak on the third and fourth days when six were lost. "The attackers were also changing their tactics. They abandoned their traditional stream for simultaneous approaches around the compass that foiled flight path prediction. Jamming tactics were more skillfully applied. Fighter-bombers attacked the SAM sites between B-52 raids. By the fifth day, the northern defenses were beginning to sag and no B-52s were lost for two full operational days. ... By December 28, the northern defenses were shattered, and B-52s roamed the skies with impunity. Hanoi could no longer track B-52s with its radar, get MiG-21 interceptors off their airfields, or launch any significant SAM defense. The damage to the north was devastating," Aviation Week said. "Virtually all industrial capacity was gone. Power generating plants and their transmitting grids were smashed. Gas and oil storage dumps were burned-out shells. Railroad marshaling yards looked like lunar landscapes. Roads and canals were clogged with shattered transport. SAM storage areas, tank, artillery and truck parks were pulverized. Military traffic dwindled to a trickle." The magazine said the defense department has hundreds of photographs authenticating the crippling damage, as well as the precision of the bombing of military targets. The pictures, it said, show some minor spillage of bombs into nearby civilian areas, "but," it declared, "they refute the claims of carpet bombing of urban areas." Countdown to Linebacker II SAC entered the SEA conflict in June 1965 with the first Arc Light mission: 27 B-52Fs from Andersen AFB, Guam iron-bombed enemy targets in Vietnam. As demand for more B-52 sorties and desire to put more bombs on targets grew, the B-52D was selected to become the workhorse. The entire B-52D fleet was upgraded for this new conventional warfare role with a modification (Big Belly) that increased bomb bay capacity to 42 750- or 84 500-pound bombs. Wing pylons could carry 24 bombs, giving the D a maximum bomb load of 108. During 1967-69, the Ds received major ECM upgrades (Rivet Rambler) that gave the D better capabilities than the G and H models. Also in 1967, Ds were sent to the Royal Thai Airfield at U Tapao (UT), Thailand. From UT, B-52s could to strike targets in Vietnam and return to base without in-flight refueling. In February 1968, the first B-52D missions were flown from Kadena AB, Okinawa, thus inaugurating a 30-month period in which three bases were involved in the B-52 effort in SEAsia. I entered the picture while these three bases supported Arc Light. To define my perspective, let me outline my background: My first 15 Air Force years were with ATC, TAC, AFSC (Systems Command), USAFSS and AF Headquarters Command in a variety of challenging positions. My first assignment from ECM tech school in 1955 was to the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Shaw AFB. Our B-25s and B-26s flew a mix of recon and jamming systems, many stemming from the Hallicrafters-managed AFQRC Program (QRC-1 modified ALA-2 Pulse Analyzers; QRC-3 & 11, APS-54 Radar Warning Receivers, QRC-11, APT-9 Transmitters). Shaw was beddown base for the RB-66B (photo recon), the WB-66D (weather recon) and the RB-66C (first aircraft designed specifically for tactical electronic recon). Run-up to beddown included TDYs to Eglin and Barksdale for AFSC and SAC systems testing/familiarization. I moved to Eglin in 1959 for joint AFSC-SAC Category II/III testing of the GAM-72 (Quail), BOMARC-B Systems Enhancements and exhaustive testing of proposed B-52H ECM systems (ALR-19, ALR-18 [from QRC-130], ALT-13, ALT-15, ALT-16 and APR-25). Hallicrafters built many of these new systems, and I was further indoctrinated into the QRC concept by a number of their top-notch technical representatives. A modified B-52G wired to accommodate any new era ECM transmitter in practically every transmitter location was our test bird. (This innovative approach gave us the ability to configure for all known/anticipated threats - becoming the B-52 standard during model upgrades.) USAFSS nabbed me in 1962, and I spent a year on a mountain in Turkey (arrived there in the midst of the Cuban Crisis!), and I then landed at the Air Force Cryptologic Depot at Kelly where we rebuilt USAFSS QRC-like systems. I returned to AFSC at Wright-Patterson for a very enlightening tour flying modified C-135s and a C-121 named "Triple Nipple" (B-50 gun turrets mounted on top) in support of a number of classified programs. Improvisation became the norm trying to keep delicate lab-quality systems operational in an airborne environment. Next was a Special NATO Assignment as Electronic Warfare Technical Advisor to Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples, Italy. All of this led to my initial SAC assignment - the 22nd Bombardment Wing (H) at March AFB, California. I was never so tested, inspected, evaluated and scrutinized in my life. That year as Shop Chief of the 22nd Avionics Squadron’s ECM Branch, truly SACumcised me and gave me an understanding for standardization that served me well at my next assignment. In July 1970, I became ECM Branch Chief of the 43rd Avionics Maintenance Squadron, tasked to support a ramp full of B-52Ds flying SEAsian combat sorties. We had a well-rounded workforce and one of SAC’s finest ECM shops. Eighth Air Force was headquartered at Andersen, and I was tapped as Special Liaison to Eighth Air Force for Defensive ECM Systems Support, affording easy access to SAC/LGMA. Shortly after my arrival, UT assumed responsibility for the Arc Light campaign, absorbing missions previously supported from Kadena and Andersen. Hosting more than 40 B-52Ds, UT’s proximity to Vietnam afforded SAC an opportunity to often fly three daily sorties with the same aircraft. Andersen returned to a nuclear alert posture and became the ECM reconfiguration/modification point for B-52Ds rotating between CONUS and SEAsia to distribute flying hours across the entire D fleet. The ECM configuration for SEAsia was totally different from the CONUS package. By the end of 1970, my workforce dwindled to five technicians - adequate for our normal load - and augmented by TDYers to support major QRC-like modification programs (during GIANT MATCH, we became "Tinker AFB West" in a max-effort ECM upgrade for the B-52D fleet). In response to the 1971 TET Offensive, SAC ordered the reconfiguration of Andersen’s nuke alert aircraft for conventional SEAsia operations and deployed our birds plus my ECM branch (except for one technician recovering from surgery) to UT. We merged with the UT workforce, and things were fine until it became clear that one lame ECM tech was unable to reconfigure the aircraft that continued to rotate between CONUS and SEAsia, so my branch was quickly returned to Andersen. Things stabilized into a routine - reconfigure a couple of aircraft weekly, prep a bird for nuke alert, pass an ORI, SAV or MSET until early 1972 and things started heating up for the next TET Offensive. We reconfigured our alert aircraft for iron bombing and sent them all to UT; however, this time I convinced Eighth and SAC to allow me and a healthy tech to remain at Andersen to handle rotating bombers. The CONUS-bound birds usually flew to Guam after a bombing sortie and sometimes had equipment failures that needed repair. Our alert force had just departed when the "What if?" discussions began. What if we received __ B-52Ds from CONUS and had to launch __ bombing sorties from here in __ days or less? How much ___ would we need? How many ___ technicians of what level? (This continued for several days, with different numbers plugged into the questions.) On 9 February 1972, "What if?" became "Bullet Shot" with the announcement that, "beginning 10 February (my 35th birthday) B-52Ds in 3-ship cells from various CONUS bases (Carswell, Dyess, March, McCoy, Westover) would begin landing until 45 are on station. All aircraft will be SEAsia configured if adequate assets are available at deploying bases; otherwise, plan reconfiguration as part of recovery/pre-launch requirements. TDY technicians are coming; however, don’t expect significant assistance for several days. And, by the way - expect to launch 15 bombing sorties by Valentine’s Day!" My workforce (myself and Steve, an ace technician) prepared for the onslaught of B-52s and, hopefully, TDY technicians. We screened supply assets and drew available equipment to stock "Supply Point" and "Build-up" for systems that required married components. We loaded our dispatch step-van, AM-17, with equipment (including a few SEAsia configuration packages that also included antenna systems/cables), leaving room for failed equipment. We included fluids, chaff, etc., to service systems. I earlier stated that we had one of SAC’s finest ECM shops. The layout was great - space, mock-ups, and test equipment were adequate, so we only had to prep all the work stations with tech data, maintenance/supply forms and telephone listings. We were as ready as we could be ... As expected, B-52s started arriving early afternoon 10 February 1972. Steve and I debriefed the first wave together. Fortunately, this group knew where they were headed and why, and had thoroughly checked their systems. We had a few malfunctions, so Steve mounted AM-17 and headed for the ramp. Our plan was that I would continue to debrief until I had a break and then contact Maintenance Control to locate Steve - I’d meet him on the ramp to review write-ups, and we’d keep this routine until we fixed everything, received help from afar or were forced to stop from exhaustion. Not all the debriefings went as well as the first wave; some had no idea where they were or why, some hadn’t bothered to run their systems, and a few aircraft had not been configured for SEAsia due to lack of assets (not a fun scenario since this meant antenna changes). A small number had good systems checks and required no maintenance, which worked in our favor for having several launch-ready bombers ECM-wise (especially if the rest of the bomber was ready for launch). Steve and I took a break around dinner time. My birthday dinner was waiting and the card from my wife read, "Happy Birthday Across the Miles!" (We lived less than a mile from the flight line). SAC policy permitted POVs on the rampm and I was using my 1962 Karman Ghia to join Steve to review write-ups, sign off forms and move equipment between B-52s and AM-17. Guam’s atmosphere in 1972 was uncontaminated; when it was dark, it was really dark. With my 6-volt headlights, you had to strike a match to see if they were on. Some B-52s were parked on the North Ramp and for some reason there were no lights on the North Ramp. Hardstands were marked with reflective numbers, and I was able to spot them with my dim headlights; however, as I was approaching a hardstand, I caught a glimpse of movement right in front of me and slammed on the brakes just in time to avoid running down the center line of a B-52D parked in the middle of the taxiway! Thanks to SAC’s reflective tape on the pants requirements, I had spotted someone walking under the airplane. Needless to say, I steered clear of the North Ramp until the lights were restored. Some 30 hours after Steve and I started our work day, I sent him home. He had practically single-handedly recovered 18 B-52s and was working a wiring problem that could take hours to complete. I debriefed the last aircraft and was arranging our status board when the first help arrived. Fortunately, it was someone I had worked with on several assignments and he had previously been stationed at Andersen. A few technicians had arrived with him; however, they hadn’t finished processing. I briefed Jim on our workforce - one tired technician and me, the status of the 45 bombers on the ramp, gave him my phone number and headed home. After a few hours sleep, I returned to find a shop full of people! Pete was ECM Branch Chief from Dyess and senior among us. Senior members from each base met to identify/assign talent to cover in-shop and flight line positions and establish teams, shift hours and work schedules to give us around-the-clock coverage. All agreed that Pete would be in charge and I would be his assistant unless/until someone more senior arrived. Before Valentine’s Day all 45 bombers were ECM-ready for launch. Our initially established structure was tweaked a couple of times but basically stayed in tact. Bullet Shot became Bullet Shot II as more B-52s arrived and daily sortie rates increased. Thanks to SAC’s dedication to standardization, merging technicians from all over SAC was amazingly simple - most troops only had to learn local phone numbers, since SAC did nearly everything exactly the same way at every SAC base. Managing assets and acquiring supplies was becoming a challenge and since I had 1½ years on station and knew key managers, I became the point may to resolve problems. Our Branch had the highest supply delivery priorities in SAC and my rapport with the Chief of Supply allowed me total access to his warehouse. Our agreement was that I process a requisition for everything needed. There were more additions to Bullet Shot (I think we finally reached Bullet Shot IV or V), but soon we had all available B-52Ds in SEAsia. In April 1972, B-52Gs joined the effort. B-52Gs and TDYers from Barksdale, Beale, Griffiss, Mather, Robins and Seymour Johnson poured in. The exact order or magnitude of arrivals is blurred, but we soon had 99 B-52Gs, 54 B-52Ds and 180 ECM technicians on station. Jack, from Robins, was the senior guy and became our new chief. The B-52G was not nearly as suited for SEAsia combat as the B-52D. The G could not carry external bombs and did not have the Big Belly mod. The G had no tail gunner to spot SAM launches from the rear and the G’s ECM package did not match that of the D’s (ALE-20, ALE-24, ALR-18, ALR-20, APR-25, ALT-16, ALT-22, ALT-28 and ALT-32) systems. This gave us real problems once virtually all of North Vietnam was cleared for bombing by mid-April. Striking targets in these North Vietnamese "Threat Zones" demanded specific ECM capabilities and the G had no ALT-22s. To complicate matters, once installed where ALT-6Bs had been, ALT-22 antenna cables chafed against the compartment door. We were able to solve the problem with elbow connectors, but acquiring enough flight-certified elbows took several days (SAC convinced AF to rob elbows from EB-66s at Shaw AFB - problem solved!). Andersen was well suited for handling B-52s. Three ramps (North, Central and South) provided hardstands for parking dozens of bomb- and fuel-loaded bombers. Maintenance hangars, engine, avionics, other field maintenance facilities and base supply are adjacent to the South Ramp. This expansion to 150 bombers exceeded the hardstand capabilities, so the Sea Bees were called upon to construct new hardstands. After a shaky start that allowed a fully loaded bomber to sink into the asphalt, the right mixture was reached to fill the bill. Concrete barracks built early in the SEAsia conflict were inadequate for even the 1960s build-up and a Tin City had been created. With this new personnel influx, Tent City was the answer. Typical U.S. Army squad tents that mounted on a wooden base with half-walls and 2 x 4 upright supports were being erected at a breakneck pace to house all the troops. Our shop space was also exceeding capacity. We needed more workbenches, tear-down tables, mock-ups and storage space. With 180 troops comes tons of talent, so we picked a carpenter team that designed tables, benches and such. The only thing missing was wood! As it turned out, three tent bases met our exact requirements. This led to heated to discussions with the Chief of Maintenance (understood my need), the Civil Engineering Chief (unsympathetic) and the Chief of Supply (understood priorities). I won when the Chief of Supply assured CE that he would get more tent bases before they were required. During a scouting trip through Base Supply, I spotted a 22-foot shuffleboard that had been removed from the NCO Club and was to be reconditioned for the Officer’s Club. A perfect candidate for a tear-down table once cut down to fit between two doorways outside the ECM Shop! I noticed shuffleboard wax granules on the floor and suggested to the warehouse guy that it might be infested with termites. He convinced the O’ Club manager that the table was unsuitable for reconditioning and it was issued to the ECM Shop. The table was 22 feet of laminated maple, 2-feet wide and a foot thick with hundreds of nails holding the laminated sections together - using a power saw was impossible - so we recruited a number of techs that took several days to cut the table down to size. The bombing operation against North Vietnam became known as "Linebacker" on 10 May 1972 and "Threat Zone" criteria were strictly enforced. If certain transmitters or particular traces on the ALR-20 Panoramic Receiver failed, the mission would abort. This could mean taking three bombers out of action since the pattern of 3-ship cells had become the standard. To save a mission, it was common to be summoned to the Command Post to troubleshoot ECM system problems via HF radio with the EWO, aircraft commander and mission director. We were able to meet threat criteria on numerous occasions by talking the EWO through a control box swap or repositioning cables on the ALR-20 to move tuner traces from a bad channel to a good one. We also gave EWOs panic fuses (painted red and really oversized) in case he was in a threat zone and experienced serious problems. In July 1972, my tour ended and I moved to Mather. Since Mather’s Gs and ECM technicians were already at Andersen, and I had met everyone, there was nothing to do at Mather but sign in, get a house and head to S.C. for a much-needed vacation. SAC/LGMA asked me to travel through Nebraska on my way east for a debriefing and hosted me for a couple of nights in the Offutt VOQ. This was especially beneficial for SAC and the workforces at UT and Andersen. Once back at Mather, there was only a skeleton crew there handling housekeeping chores and supporting nuke alert birds at Castle. In October 1972, I was tagged to return TDY to Andersen. Shortly after departing the U.S., we learned Andersen was evacuating for a typhoon - the bombers were moved to UT and Kadena. Kadena was a refueling stop (we went over the North Pole) so I was greeted there by a ramp full of B52Ds and B-52Gs! The workforce at Andersen had changed slightly since my departure in July. The troops that arrived in February with Bullet Shot I had been replaced. Jack, from Robins, was in charge of the ECM Branch and asked me to resume all the functions I previously covered. My name was still on all the accounts, so it was business as usual - with one major change! All B-52Ds and Gs were equipped with ALE-20 flare dispensing systems - 96 flares (48 in each horizontal stabilizer) each launched by an explosive charge as determined by the control box in the EWO compartment. Every B-52 is required to have an annual flare drop - always done under controlled conditions, usually over water. Ground maintenance of the ALE-20 has resulted in unscheduled annual flare drops ON THE GROUND! The flares hit the ramp with such force that many bounce into the 47-section, usually causing serious fires and lots of damage to the airframe. ECM technicians maintain the ALE-20; the flares are handled by munitions maintenance technicians. Procedures require that flares be downloaded before ECM technicians are scheduled to work the system. Tech data requires a visual inspection to ensure the canisters are empty before the system is activated. Activation requires several steps: The primary switch is in the cockpit on the pilot’s console; the circuit breaker is normally open until the system is to be activated; the control box has switches that must be pulled over detents before they can be switched on; and there is a squat switch to prevent activation while the landing gear is down that must be overridden before the system can be powered up on the ground. Standard system checkout requires a test set with devices that plug into every flare canister to actually count the firing pulses for each flare and a "red-flagged" piece of rubber that will hold the Squat Switch Override closed to permit system operation while the bomber is on the ground. Unfortunately, there was a procedure in tech data called Fast Check Out that allowed technicians to run the system without the test set. Not a problem if all the other precautions are observed. Pete and I agreed that all ALE-20 problems would require the Standard Check Out procedures and created a Maintenance Operating Instruction (MOI) signed by the chief of maintenance. Once Pete departed, someone convinced Jack to change the policy and permit Fast Check Out. I strongly protested this change and recommended we immediately return to Standard Checks; however, Jack believed our technicians were seasoned and responsible enough to avoid a drop on the ground. He agreed that should a drop occur, he would accept full responsibility. It was less than two weeks later when I arrived at the shop at 0600 to find everyone sitting around with long faces. Jack had been summoned to the ramp in the middle of the night to explain the flare drop and fire that seriously damaged a B-52D. Someone had dropped the ball, and ECM was dispatched before the flares were downloaded; technicians raced to the aircraft, blocked the squat switch with a Zippo lighter, turned on the power switch on the pilot’s console, closed the circuit breaker, turned on the power and selected Fast Train! Almost immediately, 96 flares ejected from the ALE-20! I don’t recall the write-up that caused the system checks, but apparently it was a CND! Jack was true to his word. He took the blame. I was picked to be the official spokesman for "How not to check out the system" and subsequently briefed practically every colonel and above in SAC. On 22 November 1972, the first B-52 combat loss occurred: B-52D 55-0110 out of UT was hit by a SAM during a raid on Vinh. The crew nursed the damaged aircraft back to Thailand before having to abandon their bomber before reaching UT. I heard tapes of the debriefing of the gunner. The intercom was knocked out, so he had no contact with the cockpit; but since the aircraft was stable and apparently heading toward home, he sat tight and watched a wing burn. Eventually the "bail out" alarm sounded and he spotted hatches and seats passing by. He pulled the eject handles and the gun turret fell away, giving him easy egress. Jolly Green Giant helicopters were already in the area searching for a downed fighter pilot, so the B-52 crew only had a brief wait for rescue. This was the first B-52 to be destroyed by hostile fire in more than seven years of combat operations. Linebacker II In mid-December 1972, we were notified to prepare for a max effort launch. EWOs started to visit the shop asking technical questions and picking up panic fuses. On 18 December 1972, within a couple of hours, 87 B-52Ds and Gs departed Andersen for Hanoi. These were joined by 40 B-52Ds from UT. Linebacker II was underway. Ten B-52s (5 Ds from UT, 4Ds and 1 G from Andersen) were lost from 18-24 December 1972. As this was going on, CINCSAC called aircraft and electronic experts to Offutt to search for solutions. The AFQRC Support Center participated in this effort that produced some amazing results. ECM equipment capabilities and mission tactics were severely scrutinized. Bombers flying in 3-ship cells and restrictions from maneuvering to evade SAMs, fighters or AAA were likely loss contributors. ECM capabilities were reviewed and modified; it was also suggested that additional modulation be added to the ALT-28 transmitters (both B-52Ds and Gs were wired for the QRC-218 Modulator and enough were available to equip the fleet). Tactics were developed that permitted bombers to hit targets from all directions, avoiding the 3-ship/in-trail approach. Another contributing solution was the acquisition of the downlink frequency of the SAMs. This narrow-band, low-power signal transmitted from the SAM to its control center gives positional data to the control center, allowing the SAM to be guided toward its target. Once this E/F Band signal was identified, it was decided to dedicate a number of ALT-28 transmitters, modulated by the QRC-218, to be centered on the downlink frequency. This requirement reached Andersen on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day was to be a stand down, so we had time to come up with a plan. We huddled to determine the best way to ensure the EWO could center his ALT-28s on the exact frequency. We had in stock a number of ALT-6B transmitters and oscillators in the right frequency range. The ALT-6B, a barrage jammer, is designed for the magnetron oscillator to sweep a wide frequency range. Disconnecting the modulator created a CW transmitter with a narrow pulse - great for calibrating the ALR-20; bad for magnetrons since focusing power in a narrow pulse causes magnetrons to overheat. We had plenty of the oscillators on hand, so we went with this method and installed a dual ALT-6B system in the penthouse of the Avionics building. Dual system operation allowed us to have an A and B transmitter arrangement so that if one failed, we could switch to the other and immediately replace the failed transmitter with another good item. We arranged for our PME Lab to calibrate and lock several wave meters to the exact frequency and assigned technicians to monitor the operation at all times during aircraft launch. All Andersen EWOs were briefed to warm up their ALR-20s while taxing for take-off. Once the bomber turned onto the active runway, they were to mark their ALR-20 indicators with a fine line grease pencil directly atop the target signal. On 26 December 1972, I stood on the roof of Andersen’s Avionics Maintenance building and watched 79 B-52s take off. Most of us had been too busy the previous week to take time to observe the launches. Remember, we had 150 B-52s on base, parked everywhere except the commissary parking lot, and lining up 79 to launch in the proper sequence required some real planning. From my vantage point, it was like watching a giant chess match or square dance. I don’t know who was calling the shots, but it took a real expert to move the right airplane at the right time - and it all happened without a visible glitch. Two of the bombers air aborted and returned early. The remaining 77 hit their targets and returned safely to Andersen. UT lost 5 more D models (2 on 26 December, 1 on 27 December, and 1 on 28 December). We lost another G model on 28 December. After-action reports revealed that 729 B-52 sorties were flown during Linebacker II; five MiGs were claimed by B-52 gunners, but only two confirmed. Things calmed greatly after Linebacker II, with the exception that another D from UT was lost to a SAM over Vinh in January 1973. My TDY ended in April 1973, and I returned briefly to Mather to prepare for a move to Keesler for the Avionics Superintendent Course. I moved from Keesler to Davis-Monthan, and then to Wiesbaden, Germany. I retired from the AF in 1984, stayed in Wiesbaden on an RCA contract, became an AF civilian employee, moved to an NSA assignment and retired again in 1999. From 2000 until 2005, I was a consultant with Titan Corp on a State Department project in the Republic of Georgia. Now I’m enjoying life in Spartanburg, S.C. |
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